In this paper, we consider one aspect of the problem of applying decision theory to the design of agents that learn how to make de cisions under uncertainty. This aspect con cerns how an agent can estimate probabili ties for the possible states of the world, given that it only makes limited observations be fore committing to a decision. We show that the naive application of statistical tools can be improved upon if the agent can determine which of his observations are truly relevant to the estimation problem at hand. We give a framework in which such determinations can be made, and define an estimation pro cedure to use them. Our framework also sug gests several extensions, which show how ad ditional knowledge can be used to improve the estimation procedure still :'urther.
INTRODUCTION
The problem we consider in this paper is how to es timate probabilities for states of the world, so that agents can use the techniques of decision theory to make decisions under uncertainty. We illustrate this problem with an example. Suppose we wish to de sign an agent M whose function is to deliver packages around town as swiftly as possible. We could program M with a set of different methods for doing this; for instance, it can drive between destinations using ei ther the freeway system or city roads, it can walk, it can give the package to the postal service to deliver instead, and so on. Let us ignore the enormous task of implementing each method, which is, in essence, a planning problem and beyond the scope of this work. Here we ask how the agent is to decide between them. must commit to a method before finding out about the traffic or whether it will rain. If M can associate a probability with each relevant possibility, then it can calculate expected time for each method and decide accordingly.
We will assume that M has been in situations like this before (presumably this is the case once it has been operational for a while), and so it can estimate probabilities from stored observations. However, M might actually know a lot about the current situation: it could know the time, the day of week, the season, today's weather forecast, the package's weight, the re cipient, whether the car has been serviced recently, the price of a postage stamp, and so on. What we really want is the probability of each of the events of interest (such as, it is sunny but traffic is light) conditioned on what is known. This presents a problem because, once we take all of this knowledge into account, most of M's previous data no longer pertains directly. The main is sue studied in this paper is how we can decide what information can be safely ignored as being irrelevant, so improving the quality of the estimated probabilities. The agent M might have very little data directly ap plicable to estimating the chance of "fine weather and light traffic" given all he knows, because it is likely lvf hasn't been in an identical situation often before. But we know that a lot of M's knowledge-for instance, the nature of the package and the condition of the car-has nothing at all to do with the weather or road conditions. If we estimate probabilities conditional on just relevant data, such as the forecast and the time of day, there will be many more observations that can be used.
The model which stands at the heart of classical de cision theory, and on which our work is based, is the decision matrix (see [Savage, 1954] for definitions, and Section 5 for some discussion of related work in AI).
As explained in Section 2, applying this technique re quires the estimation of the probabilities of the various states of the world that the agent considers possible. Using these probabilities, the agent can estimate the expected utility for each alternative action, and choose the one that maximizes that quantity. Unlike many previous works (e.g. [Simon and Kadane, 1975] ), we do not assume that these probabilities are made available by an external source. More realistically, we assume that the agent uses its own experience as the major source of information. The agent will thus learn from experience, by gradually refining its estimates.
Our method for estimating probabilities, which is based on a procedure that attempts to discover ir relevant attributes, is described in Section 3. Some extensions are outlined in Section 4. Our technique combines concepts reminiscent of probabilistic refer ence hierarchies (see, for example, [Bacchus, 1988] ) with statistical tools. It thus enables using statistical data, as well as less precise notions about relevance that the designer might have.
2

THE UNDERLYING MODEL
The decision-making module takes a decision problem, creates a decision-matrix, and uses that matrix to de cide on a course of action. Each row of the decision matrix is a possible action under consideration by the agent. For example, agent !If's actions might con sist of: drive on a freeway, drive on the city roads, walk, and send by mail. Of course, these high-level actions usually represent complex plans consisting of many atomic steps; the model we are using ignores the planning problem of how to determine these steps. The columns of the matrix are possible states of the world, where each state has an associated probability (the probability that it holds in this particular decision situation). These two components of the matri.. " will be described later in this section. The elements of the matrix are the agent's outcomes for each action/state pair. It is a well-known result of decision theory (see [Savage, 1954) ) that in many cases, the agent's pref erence ordering on outcomes can be expressed by nu merical utilities. In the particular context of intelligent agents, the utility will often be expressed in terms of certain parameters, such as time, fuel consumption, or money. For example, we might use time as our mea sure of utility for M. In our paper, we assume that the matrix entries are utilities, and are given in ad vance. Once the entire decision matrix is available, the agent simply chooses the action with ma."imum expected utility.
2.1
STATES AND EVENTS
We adopt a framework in which the agent observes and reasons about the world using a fixed set of at tributes, A = { A1, ... , An}, which take on values in a finite space. For example, the attribute "day of the week" has a natural set of values; an attribute such as "weather" would be partitioned into values (e.g. raining, cloudy, fine), where the granularity of the partition will depend on the agent's needs. This vocabulary must be chosen carefully, as it greatly af fects the performance of the decision-making module The attributes should be chosen to be, in some sense, independent of each other. See Section 4 for further discussion.
The most specific assertion we can make about the world is to announce the value of each A E A. This exactly determines the world as far as the agent's vo cabulary allows it to differentiate. We therefore define a state to be an assignment of a value to every at tribute in A. In the decision-theoretic paradigm, the agent's uncertainty is modeled via the existence of sev eral states that the agent believes the world could be in. 1 In general, some of the attributes in A will have no connection to the decision at hand (i.e. will not affect the outcomes of the contemplated actions). For example, although M might have an attribute describ ing the last time the car was serviced, the value of this attribute would not be relevant to the time it takes M to deliver a certain package. We define an event E to be a list of values for a subset A' of the attributes in A. We say that an event E obtains when the true state agrees with Eon all attributes in A'.
We assume that the columns of the decision matrix are all events which contain values for some specific subset A' of A. Ideally, these attributes should be those that have some connection with the actions or the decision under consideration. The smaller A' is, the easier it is to make the decision2 In our example, A' might consist of the attributes "weather" and "traffic den sity", and the column events would be all the possible assignments of values to these two attributes.
The initial information I denotes the set of attribute value pairs that the agent observes in a particular de cision making situation, i.e., before an action is chosen and executed. It should be clear that I is also an event.
2.2
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
The decision-theoretic model we are using here as sumes the existence of some objective probability dis tribution on the possible states. That is, let W be the set of all possible states of the world. We are assuming that W has the additional structure of a (presumably unknown) probability space (W, 1r) . It is unlikely to be true, in any meaningful sense, that the actual state of the world is a random draw from 1This is similar to the familiar concept of "possible worlds".
2For choosing A', all we need is some, possibly incom plete, knowledge about which attributes are "relevant" to an action. It is not necessary to know how or why a certain attribute affects the consequence of the action, or even be certain that it really does. some probability distribution, but the probabilistic model is often a good approximation to the intricately causal way the world actually works. For further dis cussion, see, for example, [Cox, 1961; Jaynes, 1968; Savage, 1954 ).
In our model, a decision-making situation evolves as follows. At the time the agent learns that he is to make a decision, the actual state of the world is regarded as being randomly chosen according to (W, 1r) . The agent has the capability of observing the values of some of the attributes, and so gains some initial information I about the chosen state. It then chooses an action (i.e., makes a decision), and afterwards, perhaps because of the action's execution, it learns more about what the world was like at decision time. That is, it learns the values of more attributes.
2.3
DATA COLLECTION
We assume that the agent has a database 1) of obser vations relating to past experiences (the integration of other types of data into our model will be discussed briefly in Section 4). To be more specific, we as sume that every data point D E 1) actually arose from some earlier decision-making episode. Thus D con tains, among possibly other things, the values for the attributes that were observed before and during the decision process, i.e., the agent's information about the state of the world holding at the time.
In order to simplify the model, we might make a com plete observability assumption: the agent always ob serves the value of every attribute in A. Consider the following example, which illustrates what can go wrong without some such requirement. Suppose that M is sometimes told about baseball games taking place in the city, and that when there is a baseball game M usually decides to walk (perhaps because baseball games generally take place when the weather is fine). Suppose, in violation of complete observability, that if the agent chooses to walk it does not find out about the traffic conditions. Then if the traffic density is in fact heavier on days in which a game takes place, M's estimate for the probability of heavy traffic will be lower than the true value, because most of its obser vations will be taken on days when there is no game. In general, complete observability avoids this and sim ilar errors because it implies that every observation in 1) truly is a random sample from (W,1r), free of unwanted bias.
In practice, complete observability can be weakened to independent observability, which says that the set of attributes the agent gets to learn about is determined independently of both the actual state of the world, and of any decision the agent takes. In the above ex ample this was violated, because whether or not the traffic was observed depended on whether the agent decided to walk, and it was this that induced bias. Of course, the independent observability requirement by itself offers no guarantee that we ever see enough data to estimate all the required probabilities. So it is also necessary to assume that, whenever A' defines the set of events for some decision the agent might be asked to make, then the chance of observing this set should be nonzero. Even this requirement can be weakened. For instance, if two attributes are rarely observed together, appropriate assumptions about conditional indepen dence can be used so as to still permit accumulation of sufficient historical data.
In subsequent sections, we shall simplify the presen tation by stating our results and techniques in terms of the complete observability assumption only. How ever, the extensions to the weaker, but more realistic, conditions are straightforward.
In practice, the most restrictive consequences of our model are as follows. First, the requirement that the information observed is an event amounts to assuming that the agent either identifies, without uncertainty, the value of an attribute or else learns nothing at all about it. But we note that if the set A is chosen well, this assumption should cause relatively little dif ficulty. The other problem with our model relates to the amount of data stored: there is little obvious scope for data summarization or compression. Currently, our estimation procedure requires every observation to be remembered (or, only slightly better, remember counts for observations that occur frequently). Significant improvements are likely to depend on domain-specific structure.
THE ESTI MATION PROBLE M
Let us review the probability estimation problem. We have some initial information I. We have determined a list of events which are the columns of the decision matrix, and wish to estimate p = Pr(EII) for each event E . Of course, how best to form these estimates is a problem in statistics.
One simple and theoretically sound estimate of p is simply the proportion of data points agreeing with E, among all points that agree with I. This estimate is "good" in several ways: for instance, it is unbiased (i.e., the expected value is exactly p) and its variance decreases to zero as the number of relevant data points grows. The problem is that the number of relevant data points may not grow very quickly because this estimate uses only those observations which agree ex actly with I. But perhaps situations matching I have not been encountered very often. For instance, if time and date are part of I, there will be no relevant his torical data at all. We conclude that this simple esti mation procedure is often impractical.
To salvage the approach to decision making we are looking at, we need to be much more clever about how we estimate probabilities. The main result of this sec tion is a technique for probability estimation which can yield substantially better results than the above. It does this by providing a framework which can cap ture and make use of additional information we have about the structure of the world (see Section 4). The underlying idea is the observation that the less specific the information in I, the more useful data points we will have. Therefore, the estimate would improve if we could (justifiably!) ignore some of the attributes mentioned in I.
It seems to be often true that, in any given context, only a few attributes will be relevant to whether some event E occurs. Consider the example in the introduc tion, where I records, among other things, which day of the week it is. If the attributes in E all refer to nat ural phenomena, such as the the weather conditions, we would expect the day of the week to be irrelevant to-and, in a sense which is easy to make precise, in dependent of-whether E occurs. In this case, the best estimate of p would pool data for all days, even though this ignores some of the knowledge contained in I. In general, it is not reasonable to require all such infor mation about relevance to be supplied ahead of time.
In the example, we would want the estimation proce dure to find out for itself whether the day of the week is unimportant.
We begin by looking at the base case of our technique. Suppose I includes the value of some attribute A. Let h, h, . .. , Ik be all events which are just like I, except possibly with respect to the value of A; we may as sume that h = I. Intuitively, we can pool data only if our knowledge about A is irrelevant to p. More for mally, we ask whether the conditional probabilities Pi (i.e., Pr(EII;)) are the same for all i. Our procedure is to test whether this independence is plausible, and then use either the pooled or non-pooled estimate as appropriate. Both the test and the estimate itself can make use of all the observed data in 1).
In the following, let N; be the number of observations in 1) agreeing with I;. Let Pi be the proportion of these observations that do in fact agree with the values specified in E. We estimate p either as p1 or else as the pooled estimate p = 0::"'1 p;N;)/N, where N = 2:: :"'1 N;. Note that p1 is simply the direct estimate which was mentioned earlier. We decide which of these two possibilities to use on the basis of a hypothesis test (the hypothesis being that p; =Pi> for all i,j.)
One relatively simple hypothesis test we can use for this is the x2 test, which is discussed in most statistics texts (such as, [Larsen and Marx, 1981; Sachs, 1982] ). The test is based t•n the value X2 = 2:: : "' 1 (p;-fi? N;j(p ( 1-p) ). If the hypothesis (equal Pi) is true, and the Ni are not too small,3 then the dis-3 A frequently stated rule of thumiJ is that N;p; should tribution of X2 is very well approximated by the x2 distribution with k-1 degrees of freedom. In order to perform the test, we must choose some small a > 0, which becomes the chance of not pooling data when it really would have been permissible. We accept the hy pothesis and use the pooled estimate just if X2 < ca, where c" is such that the chance of a random sam ple from x2 exceeding c" is a. The value c" can be found from tables. It is generally desirable to have a very small, but note that as a decreases the chance of incorrectly deciding to pool data when this is not jus tified grows. Later we state two asymptotic properties of our estimation procedure, whose proof assumes that a is 1/ Nd, for some d > 1. That is, as the sample size increases we should tolerate less chance of deciding in correctly not to pool data. It turns out that, so long as a grows smaller no faster than this, the chance of pooling inappropriately also diminishes rapidly.
To recap, the general idea of our procedure is to test for independence and then use the estimate suggested by the result of the test. The hypothesis test can be done in many ways, and we have suggested one possibility, the x2 test. We chose this test because its simplicity facilitates the analysis.
This analysis is important because the procedure uses the same data for both the independence test and for the actual estimate. In this way, we can hope to make the best use of scarce data. But reusing sampled data destroys the independence between the outcome of the hypothesis test and the estimate used, and so we must check that the process as a whole gives us a useful re sult. For example, it is easy to see that both the pooled estimate p and the simple estimate p1 are unbiased if the hypothesis of equal Pi is in fact true. But it does not follow just from this that the composite estimate is unbiased.4 Another related issue concerns the esti mate's variance: intuitively, we only pool data if all the p; are approximately the same, and so it might seem that the pooled estimate is only used when it provides little additional information over p1 anyway.
It turns out that neither of these problems arise: the estimate we give is asymptotically unbia�ed, and has asymptotic variance that can be much smaller than p1. In other words, at least for large N, our estimate is indeed very likely to be close to the true value. Fur thermore, if the hypothesis of equal p; is true, then our estimate has smaller variance than the simple un pooled estimate p1 and so is likely to be much closer to p. The formal statement of these results is contained be larger than 5, for all i.
4
To illustrate the possible problems, suppose that the test is such that the hypothesis of equal p; is slightly more likely to be accepted when the observations satisfy p < fj, than it is otherwise. Then this would bias our estimate. Because we reuse data, the test does get to see the actual values of the estimates p and fj,, and so such behavior cannot be ruled out without deeper analysis.
in the following two theorems (whose proofs are too long for inclusion here) .5
Theorem 3.1: If in fact p; = p for all i, then the estimat e we give has mean J.l and variance cr2 such that J.l-->P and cr2--+p(1 -p)/ N as N ---+ oo. 6 We note that this asymptotic variance is the best that can be achieved by any unbiased estimate, even if we know for certain that the hypothesis of equal probabilities is true.
Theorem 3.2: If in fact p; i: Pi for some i, j then the estimate we give has mean J.l, and variance cr2 such that J.l-->Pl and cr2-->p1 (1-pt)f N1 as N ---+ 00. We note that this asymptotic variance is the smallest pos sible amongst unbiased estimates of p; (given that ob servations relating to I;, for i -j: 1, are regarded as being not informative about p1).
Although these theorems give asymptotic results only, it seems very likely that the procedure will work well for far smaller sample sizes than were required in our proof. Proving a precise claim about this would be dif fi cult. Instead, we have programmed the technique to run on simulated data, and the results there did con fi rm this expectation. When the data was generated for each class using the same underlying probability, the decision was made to pool data most of the time.
In one typical experiment, 200 data points were succes sively generated for each of five events, and on average the procedure declined to pool data less than 5% of the time. If the probabilities differ between classes, even by relatively small amounts-and note that the closer the probabilities are to being equal, the less damage is done by incorrect pooling-our procedure rapidly dis covered this. In one experiment, where the difference between all probabilities was less than or equal to 0.1, the procedure apparently stabilized on a decision not to pool after each class had accumulated about 150 data points. A similar experiment where the proba bilities differed by up to 0.3 stabilized after about 15 data points per event on average.
The procedure so far will, in effect, decide whether to ignore one particular attribute of I. In general, sev eral attributes of I may turn out to be irrelevant. Our technique extends easily to such cases. Suppose that we have decided to ignore some attribute A of I (using a test like that just suggested). That is, we have ac cepted the hypothesis that P1·(E\I) = Pr(E\I') for all 5Note that if we did not reuse dat�, the proof of these theorems would be nearly trivial (becaase then the hypoth esis test would be certain to be independent of both p and P• ). Furthermore, the results would be somewhat tighter;
e.g. , the composite estimate would be unbiased even for finite sample sizes.
6This is not quite correct as stated, because N can grow without bound even as some No stays small. The conver gence we have in mind here is that, as N tends to infinity, each N; must be bounded below by Nc for some c > 0.
I' that are like I except for the value of A. But from this it also follows that Pr(E\I) = P r(E\ (1 -A) ),
where by I -A we mean the event formed from I by omitting A and its value. We have thus reduced our problem to fi nding a good estimate of the latter prob ability. The earlier procedure-looking for irrelevant attributes-is immediately applicable again. In this way, we can achieve a substantial increase in the qual ity of the estimate. Note that we do not require that the attributes be considered in any particular order.
JUSTIFICATION AND EXTENSIONS
The success of our technique depends on whether the vocabulary of attributes used to define events really reflects the way the world works. For example, the at tributes A, = day of the week and A 2 = the weather seem to be fairly independent of each other; there are many contexts where just one of these is relevant. On the other hand, consider A�, which tells us the day of the week if it is Monday or Wednesday and the weather otherwise, and A� which tells us the weather on Mon day or Wednesday, and the day otherwise. It is not easy to imagine a context where just one of {A�, A�} is relevant. Both these sets of attributes are equally informative for describing what the world is actually like. Our judgment that {A 1 , A 2 } is better seems to be based on knowledge we have about the causal struc ture of the world? Our technique is a framework that allows such knowledge to be usefully incorporated into the decision making process. Equally important is that we do not rely on a precise or accurate statement of this knowledge.
Sometimes we have additional knowledge, beyond just a feeling about what a suitable attribute vocabulary should be. A feature of our technique is that it al lows easy extensions to cope with many types of extra information. For instance:
• If we are able to provide actual probabilities di rectly, there is nothing preventing them being used; the estimation procedure can be bypassed when not needed. Similarly, the method can be modified to incorporate statistical data from di verse external sources.
• If we know that some particular attributes can be ignored in certain contexts, then the hypothesis test is redundant and can be omitted. In partic ular, if some restrictions on the possible relation ships between attributes are given to the agent (for example, as a reference hierarchy), this can be used in our process. By avoiding the hypothesis 7This is reminiscent of the well-known "grue/bleen" paradox ( [Goodman, 1955] ), which concerns the attribute vocabulary appropriate for inductive inference.
test, we gain computational efficiency and elimi nate the chance of error.
• Suppose we know that if some attribute is rele vant, then it must affect probabilities in a partic ular way. As an example, I am not sure whether the probability of traffi c congestion on a particu lar highway depends on which day of the week it is. I know that, if the day of the week is in fact rel evant, then this probability is lower on weekends. This knowledge suggests using a different test for independence. We test the hypothesis that the probability is independent of the day, against the alternatives (which have different probabilities f01' each day, but definitely lower on Saturday and Sunday). We omit details of such a test here. In general, whenever our knowledge can restrict the possible alternatives, a hypothesis test can achieve the same confidence using less data.
• So far, we have regarded the classes considered for pooling as being implicitly defined by the attribute vocabulary. However, our knowledge about the domain may suggest other classes as well. In our earlier example, to estimate the chance of heavy traffic congestion on a Tuesday it might be useful to consider pooling data over just weekdays (Monday to Friday), as well as over the class of all days. It is even possible to use statistical procedures to suggest useful classes, on the basis of previously collected data (but then we must be careful to use a different set of data for the hypothesis test and estimation procedure, because the results would be statistically invalid otherwise).
Finally, we note that the correctness of our technique depends on the stability over time of the underlying probability distribution. If this cannot be assumed it would be sensible to ignore or discount older obser�a tions. There are several standard ways this might be done. Nevertheless, it is clear that robustness against changes in the underlying distribution can only be ob tained at the price of slower or Jess accurate learning.
CO MPARISON TO OTHER WORK
Although many techniques of decision theory have been utilized in artificial intelligence, the decision ma trix paradigm of separating the probabilities of states from the utilities has been relatively ignored. Many researchers who adopt the concept of maximizing ex pected utility (see [Etzioni, 1989b; Wellman, 1990; Russel and Wefald, 1988] ) compute the expected utility for each action directly. A sepa rate computation of utilities has the major advantage of allowing additional information about utilities and probabilities, arising from different sources, to be used.
The description of a state may be detailed enough so that the utility of an action at that state can be com p � ted using knowledge about causality that the agent might have. For example, the agent might know that when the state of the world is such that there is light traffic and the weather is good, then the action of driv ing ten miles on a freeway must take about ten min utes, because the average velocity in those conditions is 55 miles per hour. Also, by dividing the estimation process into two stages, more historical data will be us able. For example, the agent might conclude that the exact day of the week (say Friday) is relevant to the probability of having heavy traffic, and will therefore use only the historical data about Friday to compute it. But heavy traffic also occurs on other days ( al tJ : ough with different probabilities), so that the agent will be able to use all that additional data to compute the expected driving time given heavy traffic. This leads to more accurate estimates.
'Y hile some research in AI has adopted this separa tiOn of probabilities and utilities (notably [Haddawy and Hanks, 1990; Simon and Kadane, 1975] ), the problem of estimating the probabilities in the face of too much initial information has not, to our knowl edge, been attacked directly. Some works [Simon and Kadane, 1975) simply assume that the probabilities are known in advance. Others (e.g. [Bundy, 1984; Lee and Mahajan, 1988] ) suggest the concept of sam plin�, but do not discuss which class to sample. Ren dell l � endell, 1983) deals � ith the concept of sampling on different classes, but m the very limited context of search trees. Etzioni's work [Etzioni, 1989a) on es ti . mating u � ilities is based on machine learning tech mques, which attempt to discover classes over which the utility is homogeneous. Such homogeneity usu ally arises due to a deterministic relationship between the properties of the class and the utility (such as the driving time given light traffic described above). These techniques do not carry over to estimating probabili ties, because the only way to achieve homogeneity in classes of binary values is to have the entire class be all zeros or all ones. I.e., the class will be such that it deterministically forces the truth value of the event. Typically, it is impossible to find an attribute language precise enough to define such classes.
A different approach to finding the right class for esti mating probabilities is to treat the problem of inferring the independence structure as a separate task. For ex ample, [Fung and Crawford, 1990 ) use techniques sim ilar to ours-classical statistics, and in particular, the x2 test-in a system which infers qualitative structure from data, modeling this structure as a probabilistic network. Once constructed, the network can be used for several purposes, such as estimation. The major drawback of this technique is that a separate data set is required for the construction of the network. It is not clear how this technique can be safely extended to reuse data. Therefore, larger amounts of data will be needed. Our approach is also better in situations where new data is being constantly accumulated, be cause the new information could cause us to change our decision as to the relevance of certain attributes. [Fung and Crawford, 1990 ] also show how to find the smallest possible set of relevant attributes. This proce dure is computationally expensive and relies on strong assumptions about the relationships among the at tributes. These assumptions also prevent the proce dure in [Fung and Crawford, 1990 ] from being effi ciently used in our framework, because each decision situation will need to be investigated separately. This eliminates the computational advantage of computing the entire independence structure simultaneously. Our approach eliminates the attributes one by one, in an arbitrary order. While not guaranteed to find the min imal set of relevant attributes, this technique is much faster and requires no assumptions.
We conclude this section by comparing our methods to the Bayesian approach. It should be noted that, if prior probabilities are available, Bayesian updating (see [Jaynes, 1968] ) can, in a sense, replace the x2 test described in Section 3. \Ve have chosen not to ussume the existence of prior probabilities, and therefore use a technique from classical statistics. A work similar in outlook to ours, which deals with a different prob lem using Bayesian techniques is Pearl's work about hierarchies of hypotheses [Pearl, 1986] .
CONCLUSION
We have investigated the problem of estimating the conditional probability of a state given some initial information I, based on a database of observations. This problem is straightforward when there is plenty of data. However, in many situations, there is little data that exactly matches I. Our main result discusses how to utilize the available data in order to decide which attributes in I are irrelevant, and how to use the in formation about irrelevance to improve the estimate's quality. A feature of our approach is that it uses all the available data for both this decision and for the actual estimation.
We have discussed in detail the assumptions that are required to make our approach sound. For example, the model is simplified by the (commonly made) as sumption we call complete observability, that is, that all data points contain observations about every at tribute. However, we discuss a relaxation of this, in dependent observability, which is far more realistic yet still permits efficient estimation.
The idea behind our approach to estimation is not limited to finding conditional probabilities. For in stance, in the context of decision theory which moti vates the work in this paper, another important appli cation would be the estimation of utilities; we believe that this is likely to be a straightforward extension of the present work.
The most important factor in the success of our ap proach will be the quality of the attribute vocabulary that the agent uses to describe the world. Whether made explicit or not, this theme recurs throughout AI. In our approach, this issue is prominent, and we may hope that our more technical results and discussion will serve to shed some light on this fundamental is sue.
Finally, we note that one of the advantages of our framework is that it can be extended in several di rections, to make use of other knowledge aside from raw observational data. A few suggestions towards this were described in Section 4, but clearly this does not exhaust all the possibilities.
